Cavalry Werewolf Unleashed: A New Nation-State Threat Targeting Energy and Government Sectors

A cyberespionage syndicate named Cavalry Werewolf used sophisticated phishing methods to pose as Kyrgyz government officials in order to target Russian government agencies and important industries like manufacturing, mining, and energy between May and August 2025. The campaign used unusual tools like Telegram bots for command and control to distribute custom malware, such as FoalShell and StallionRAT, which allowed for remote access, data theft, and persistence. The actor probably originates from Kazakhstan and appears to be broadening its geographical emphasis. It has been linked to well-known threat groups such as YoroTrooper and Tomiris. Separately, web application attacks compromised more than 500 Russian companies, exposing a wider and growing threat to the region’s public and private sector infrastructure.

Technical Description

Cavalry Werewolf is a recently identified threat actor that uses spoofed or compromised Kyrgyz government email accounts to deliver RAR archives containing advanced malware. The campaign makes use of FoalShell, a cross-compiled reverse shell (Go/C++/C#), as well as StallionRAT, a multi-language remote access trojan that uses Telegram for command and control. These programs support remote command execution, data exfiltration, and persistence methods such as PowerShell obfuscation, Run key registry modifications, and file placement in unusual folders. The details and technicalities of the campaign are discussed further.

Delivery and Infection Chain:

The primary method by which Cavalry Werewolf obtains initial access is through targeted spear-phishing. In emails that impersonate Kyrgyz government officials (including those sent from compromised Kyrgyz mailboxes), weaponized RAR attachments that unpack FoalShell or StallionRAT are delivered. Additionally, attackers exploit public-facing web application compromises (gs-netcat/web shells) and legitimate admin tools (Adminer, mysqldump) to extend their footholds. Their Infection Chain is followed as mentioned below,

  • Through social engineering, the actor lists high-value targets and gathers email addresses, public-facing app details, and human targets.
  • In order to increase the credibility of future deceptions, the actor, if feasible, compromises official Kyrgyz government mailboxes.
  • Targets receive spoof or compromised Kyrgyz government-style emails with links to compromised public web apps or weaponized RAR attachments.
  • When the victim extracts or runs the RAR payload—typically through user action—FoalShell or StallionRAT variants are dropped and launched.
  • Malware creates C2: StallionRAT connects using a Telegram-based bot or creates proxy tunnels (ReverseSocks5); FoalShell launches an interactive reverse shell.
  • Devices are identified, credentials are gathered, and system/database artifacts are gathered via remote commands and integrated modules.
  • The actor maintains persistence via running registry key modifications and nonstandard file locations (such as C:\Users\Public\Libraries), deploying proxy agents, abusing legitimate admin tools, or moving laterally using credentials that were obtained.
  • Using web shells, Telegram uploads, SOCKS5 tunnels, or database dump tools like mysqldump, collected data is staged locally and exfiltrated.
  • To keep or restore access for follow-on operations, the actor installs extra backdoors or web shells (gs-netcat, admin tools).

Technical Capabilities

Cavalry Werewolf demonstrates polished operational tradecraft, including targeted social engineering using spoofed identities and legitimately compromised mailboxes, the ability to run targeted espionage and opportunistic web-app campaigns, rapid cross-platform tooling adoption (porting code between Go, C++, C#, Python, and PowerShell), and flexible C2 design that combines commodity services (Telegram) with anonymizing proxies (SOCKS5). The group uses legitimate administrative utilities (Adminer, phpMiniAdmin, mysqldump) for data extraction and lightweight persistent implants and web shells (gs-netcat) to maintain long-term footholds, indicating coordinated red-team style planning and tolerance for multi-stage, stealthy intrusion lifecycles.

With its small footprint for reconnaissance, easy portability across Windows environments, and dependable remote command execution via cmd.exe, FoalShell is a powerful reverse shell family that has been compiled across Go, C++, and C# variants. Instead of handling large amounts of data, it is made for quick interactive control and script invocation. Further, the StallionRAT is a modular RAT that integrates Telegram-based C2 Implemented in Go, PowerShell, and Python, for data transfer and command issuance. It can be used to upload files (/upload), execute arbitrary commands using InvokeExpression (/go), and enumerate infected hosts (/list). Additionally, it can be used in conjunction with ReverseSocks5 agents to create covert tunnelling for lateral movement and exfiltration. These tools, which have layered obfuscation and persistence mechanisms that make standard detection and takedown efforts more difficult, allow for both immediate interactive control and sustained, feature-rich operations.

Attribution and Evolution

The group is actively experimenting with multi-language malware, commodity web shells, and hybrid C2 (consumer platforms + proxy chains), indicating a shift from opportunistic compromises toward more deliberate, scalable espionage operations. Telemetry and tooling overlap link Cavalry Werewolf to clusters tracked as YoroTrooper, Tomiris (Microsoft’s Storm-0473 lineage), ShadowSilk, and others, suggesting a regional nexus—possibly Kazakhstan-affiliated—with evolving capabilities.

Active Campaign and Geographic Spread

Between May-Aug 2025, activity targeted Russian state agencies and critical infrastructure sectors (energy, mining, manufacturing). However, English, and Arabic filenames and incidents reported in Russia, Tajikistan, and the Middle East indicate a broader operational footprint. Based on analysis and related reports also highlight widespread web-app compromises across Russian organizations, underscoring both targeted and opportunistic campaign elements.

Conclusion:

Cavalry Werewolf is an adaptive espionage threat actor that uses targeted phishing, mailbox compromise, custom cross-platform shells, and web-attack techniques. Defenders should treat incidents as persistent, multi-stage intrusions that require coordinated detection (email, endpoint, network, and application layers), rapid containment, and cross-organizational intelligence sharing to limit damage and prevent re-compromise.

Impact

The use of proxying, resilient persistence, and encrypted/consumer C2 channels by the actor makes detection and remediation more difficult. Successful intrusions could have high impact that would result in extensive espionage and data theft (sensitive government and industrial documents, database exfiltration), covert long-term access for follow-on operations, potential operational disruption via lateral movement or sabotage, and significant reputational, regulatory, and supply-chain risk to affected organizations.

IOC and Context Details

Topics Details
Tactic Name Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, Command & Control, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Exfiltration
Technique Name Spear-phishing (attachment/link)
Mailbox compromise
Command execution
Reverse shell
Registry persistence
Web shell deployment
Proxying / SOCKS5 tunneling
Data extraction & exfiltration
Sub Technique Name Spear-phishing with malicious RAR attachment
Compromised or impersonated legitimate email account
Commands executed via cmd.exe
Registry Run-key persistence
Files dropped in non-standard locations (C:\Users\Public\Libraries)
Reverse SOCKS5 tunnel for proxying attacker traffic
Database dumping via mysqldump / Adminer abuse
Attack Type Malware
Targeted Applications Microsoft Exchange, MySQL, RAR Archives
Region Impacted Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Middle East
Industry Impacted Government, Energy, Mining, Manufacturing, Commerce, Finance, Education
IOC’s File Names (FoalShell)
О результатах трёх месяцев совместной работы [redacted].exe
Список сотрудников выдвинутых к премии ко Дню России.exe.exe
Приказ о поощрении сотрудников ко дню России (Т-11а) №1 от 30.05.2025.exe
О ПРЕДОСТАВЛЕНИИ ИНФОРМАЦИИ ДЛЯ ПОДГОТОВКИ СОВЕЩАНИЯ.exe
О работе почтового сервера план и проведенная работа.exe
О проведении личного приема граждан список участников.exe
Служебная записка от 16.06.2025___________________________.exe
Программный офис Управления ООН по наркотикам и преступности.exe
План-протокол встречи о сотрудничестве представителей должностных лиц.exe
Аппарат Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросу реализации проектов в СФО.exe
Информация по письму в МИД от 6 июля и прилагаемые документы.exe

File Names (StallionRAT)
Аппарат Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросу реализации проектов в СФО.exe

Hashes (SHA-256)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Reverse SOCKS5
fbf1bae3c576a6fcfa86db7c36a06c2530423d487441ad2c684cfeda5cd19685

Reverse SOCKS5 Agent
a3ec2992e6416a3af54b3aca3417cf4a109866a07df7b5ec0ace7bd1bf73f3c6

IP Addresses
188.127.225[.]191:443
94.198.52[.]200:443
91.219.148[.]93:443
185.244.180[.]169:443
109.172.85[.]95:443
185.231.155[.]111:443
185.173.37[.]67:443
188.127.227[.]226:443
62.113.114[.]209:443
96.9.125[.]168:443
78.128.112[.]209:10443
CVE N/A

Recommended Actions

  • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all email and critical systems.
  • Employees should be trained to spot and report spear-phishing emails, particularly those that pose as government representatives
  • Monitor and restrict use of PowerShell and command-line execution with logging and alerts on suspicious encoded commands.
  • Implement stringent email filtering and attachment scanning procedures, preventing unknown senders and malicious RAR archives.
  • Audit and harden persistence points, including registry run keys and odd file locations, on a regular basis.
  • Deploy network monitoring to uncover illegal Telegram bot communications and unusual SOCKS5 proxy traffic.
  • Conduct regular vulnerability assessments and patch web applications to prevent compromise via public-facing services.
  • Maintain updated endpoint detection with behavioral analytics to identify custom malware like FoalShell and StallionRAT.

References

https://bi.zone/eng/expertise/blog/cavalry-werewolf-atakuet-rossiyu-cherez-doveritelnye-otnosheniya-mezhdu-gosudarstvami/